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Algebraic Structure of Blockchains: A Group-Theoretical Primer
DONGFANG ZHAO, University of Nevada, Reno
Although recent advances of blockchain systems, notably in the form of cryptocurrency, have drawn tremendous interests from both
researchers and practitioners, limited studies existed toward the theoretical foundation of blockchains. This paper presents the first
study on the algebraic structure of blockchains with an emphasis on the internal properties under algebraic groups. We axiomatically
construct a blockchain group and derive some interesting properties that can be potentially taken into the design space and parametric
analysis of real-world blockchain systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
While recent advances of blockchain systems, notably in the form of cryptocurrency, have drawn tremendous interests
from both researchers and practitioners [5, 7], limited studies existed toward the theoretical foundation of blockchains
before in 2017Herlihy [4], for the first time, brought up the connection between blockchains and distributed computing.
Admittedly, the original blockchain paper authored by Nakamoto [1] lacked formal proofs, and yet, Bitcoin, as the
banding name of public blockchains, has proven to be a stable production system. As we have witnessed in many other
physical sciences, not every discipline started with the rigorous theory before the applications spread out vividly; in
fact, it often happened in a reverse way: the internal law was found after people observed many instances for a while.
We believe this would be the orbit of the development of blockchains: we have witnessed many successful instances
of blockchains, now it might be the time for developing, or extracting, the internal laws of blockchains.
This paper strives to take a rigorous mathematical methodology to better understand blockchains’ fundamental
properties. More specifically, we are interested in unraveling blockchain’s algebraic structures—the very underneath
commonality among production blockchain systems. We are aware of a parallel study on blockchain theory from a
game theory standpoint (e.g., [6]), which focused on the rationality and equilibrium of blockchain nodes. In contrast,
our line of works aims to reveal the intrinsic laws of blockchain states and actions through algebraic structures.
In the remainder of this paper, we will provide a very high-level introduction to blockchains and algebraic groups.
Then, we will define some components that are needed for the axiomatic construction of blockchain groups. After
that, we will show that the construction indeed forms a well-defined algebraic group and more importantly, derive
some interesting properties that can be potentially considered in real-world blockchain design and analysis. We finally
conclude this paper and discuss future research directions.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Blockchkains
A blockchain is a replicated database deployed to a distributed system. By default, each node of the distributed system
holds a full copy of the data, usually in a transactional form. Each replica of the database is organized as a hashed-
linkedlist of blocks of those transactional data such that the data cannot be compromised unless the entire chain is
reconstructed from scratch, which is computationally and financially prohibitive. Since the overall system is replicated,
the system employs some consensus protocols for all replicas to agree on.
A rough categorization of blockchains is based on its user membership: if the system is publicly open to every-
one, then the blockchain is called permissionless; otherwise, the blockchain is called permissioned. Most of production
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blockchain systems are permissionless, and they are the emphasis of this paper. At the writing of this paper, the most
popular blockchain system Bitcoin, is comprised of about 9,800 nodes [2]. Each of such nodes might be in the form of
a coalition of many physical machines, namely a pool [3].
2.2 Algebraic Groups
The algebraic group is one of the most fundamental abstract algebraic structures—the basis of many more derived
structures such as rings and fields. Essentially, a group is a set of elements along with a binary operation defined on
these elements: The operation is associative and there exists an inverse for every element such that the product between
an element and its inverse is an identify element. A group is usually constructed axiomatically: first, define the set and
binary operation and then show that all aforementioned properties are satisfied.
Of of the most interesting groups are called symmetric group, denoted as SΩ , whose elements are permutations of the
elements in set Ω, and the binary operation is simply the function composition between two permutations. Historically,
early group-theoretical studies focused on the internal structure of SΩ because it has a rich set of properties that can
be applied to real-world disciplines such as computational chemistry and theoretical physics. We will also leverage SΩ
in our study on blockchain groups.
3 DEFINITIONS
We use N to denote the set of all nodes in the blockchain system. We denote the set of all r mining pools or clusters
byC = {c0, c1, . . . , cr−1}. Of note, c0 represents a dummy set of all the singleton nodes, i.e., those nodes that decide to
mine the block individually without joining any pools. In practice, we can assume r ≪ |N | as most nodes choose to
join a pool.
Definition 3.1 (Node-switch map φ). We assume that any node can freely1 switch from one pool to another through
a node-switch map of an arbitrary node n ∈ N from C to C , φn : C → C , such that:
φn (ci ) = cj if n ∈ ci and n switches to pool cj , where 0 ≤ i, j < r .
Note that we do not require i , j for a node-switch; the map φ is well defined even if the node stays in the same
pool. We will simply say φn (i) = j if it is clear from the context that both i and j are indices for pools. We use Φi to
denote a set of node-switches covering all the nodes exactly once, where 0 ≤ i < |N |r . Obviously, we have |Φi | = |N |
for all i’s. We call Φi a node-switch set (of index i).
Definition 3.2 (Pool-update map σ ). When the membership of a specific pool is updated, e.g., a new node joins or an
existing node leaves, we denote such an change as a pool-update, which is, formally, defined as a map σ : Φ → Φ.
We define the set of all possible maps σ ’s (among Φ’s) as Ω. It should be clear that it is the map σ between node
switch sets Φ’s, not Φ per se, serving as an element in Ω. As an analogy, in the well-known symmetric group Sn , it is
the permutation between series of numbers, rather than the series itself, being considered as the element of Sn . We
then define ⋆ as a function composition between two σ ’s among Φ’s. Obviously, we have |Ω | = |N |r . Formally:
σ1 ⋆ σ2 = σ3 if for any n ∈ N , {φn(i) = j} ⊆ σ1 ∧ {φn(j) = k} ⊆ σ2 ⇒ {φn (i) = k} ⊆ σ3 .
Note that ⋆ is well defined because for any σ , all elements in N appear on some source pools (cf. Def. 3.2, |Φ| = |N |).
If the context is clear, we will simply write σ1σ2 to denote the two elements in Ω operate under ⋆.
1Which is true for permissionless blockchains.
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Now we are ready to show that set Ω forms an algebraic group under ⋆.
4 GROUP-THEORETICAL INTERNALS OF BLOCKCHAINS
4.1 Axiomatic Construction
It boils down to demonstrating the following axioms for Ω to be a group under ⋆:
• Operation ⋆ is associative: for any σi ∈ Ω, σj ∈ Ω, and σk ∈ Ω, we have σi ⋆ (σj ⋆ σk ) = (σi ⋆ σj )⋆ σk ;
• An identity element, denoted as e ∈ Ω, exists such that for any σ ∈ Ω, we have e ⋆ σ = σ ⋆ e = σ ;
• For any σ ∈ Ω, there exists an inverse counterpart, denoted as σ−1, such that σ ⋆σ−1 = σ−1 ⋆ σ = e .
We will show that all aforementioned axioms hold.
4.1.1 Associativity. Let n ∈ N be any node in the blockchain. Let φn (a) = b be any node switch in map σk . Recall that
there are a total of |N | node switches in σj . By definition of σ , there must exist one and only one node switch from b
in σk : φn (b) = c , where c is the destination pool Cc . Then by definition of function association, we know φn (a) = c
is in σj ⋆ σk . Now, without loss of generality, let φn (d) = a be a node switch in σi . By definition of ⋆, we have that
φn (d) = c is a node switch in σi ⋆ (σj ⋆ σk ). Note that both d and a are arbitrary indices of pools.
Similarly, if we know φn (d) = a is a node switch in σi and φn (a) = b be a node switch in σj , respectively, we then
know that φn(d) = b be a node switch in σi ⋆ σj . Consequently, if we know φn (b) = c is a node switch in σk , then we
have, again, φn (d) = c is a node switch in σi ⋆ (σj ⋆ σk ).
We thus have shown that ⋆ is associative in Ω.
4.1.2 Identity. We construct e as a σ with its |N | elements each of which is a trivial node switch: φn (i) = i for all
n ∈ N . Obviously, any pool update would be mapped to its original structure after applying e , regardless of both left-
and right-side function composition. It should be noted, again, that each element of Ω is the map over the set of |N |
node switches, not the node switches themselves.
4.1.3 Inverse. For an arbitrary σ , each of the |N | node switches can be written as φn (i) = j. Because Ω is the set
including all the possible maps between pool-updates, there must exist a unique σ−1 whose elements can be exactly
written in the this form: φn (j) = i . Then, for σ ⋆ σ−1, each node switch follows φn(i) = i , comprising e ; similarly, for
σ−1 ⋆ σ , each node switch follows φn(j) = j, again, comprising e .
Remark. By construction, the group constructed from Ω and ⋆ is not commutative, or non-abelian in the literature
of group theory.We will denote such a blockchain group as Bn,r , wheren = |N | and r = |C |. From the above discussion,
we know the order of Bn,r is |Bn,r | = nr .
4.2 Algebraic Properties and Applications
This section presents some important properties implied by the non-abelian blockchain group Bn,r .
4.2.1 Subgroups, laices, normal subgroups, and kernels. One of the most notable properties exhibited by Bn,r lies at
its order nr . We thus can rewrite it as follows:
|Bn,r | = nr = pα1r1 × · · · × p
αk r
k
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where n = pα11 . . .p
αk
k
where pi is a prime, pi < pj for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k and for any 1 ≤ j ≤ k we have αj ≥ 1. Note that,
by this factorization, we have pi ∤ p
α jr
j for i , j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k , where a ∤ b reads a cannot divide b . It follows that
|Bn,r | = pαiri ·m and pi ∤m, where m = |Bn,r | · p
−αir
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
which is exactly the form well studied by Sylow’s Theorem: if a group can be written in this form, we know that there
must exist a subgroup of order pαiri in Bn,r , where 1 ≤ i ≤ k . Since there k such primes, we know that Bn,r has at
least k subgroups. Consequently, we know that Bn,r has a nontrivial lattice of subgroups. This result itself could be
useful for applications such as cryptography, potentially leading to a new interdisciplinary research area: leveraging
blockchain’s internal algebraic structure for encryption.
It would be highly useful if we could know how many of these subgroups are normal, each of which essentially
corresponds to a kernel of Bn,r that is widely used in group-theoretical applications. However, without instantiating
of n and r , it is not analytically feasible to give the solution, and this is particularly true if n or r or both is a medium or
large number. Nonetheless, we want to point out that for small-order subgroups, one can leverage Cayley’s Theorem
and Corollary: if p is the smallest prime that divides |B |, then for any subgroup H of B, denoted as H ≤ B, if |B ||H | = p,
then H is normal, denoted as H E B. Therefore, for small p, such as 2 that is very likely included in the prime series
of factors (p1,p2, . . . ,pk ) of |Bn,r |, we can determine whether a subgroup H by checking nr = 2|H |. If so, we will then
have a lot of important applications built upon the kernel H .
4.2.2 Coset order and element order. According to Lagrange’s Theorem, the number of cosets of a subgroup H in Bn,r ,
essentially the number of possible translates of H from any σ ∈ Ω, can be calculated as nr|H | . This can be translated
into the blockchain network as: if we know an active subset of σ ’s included in a subgroup H ≤ G, then we can quickly
determine exactly the number of (much fewer) possibilities that the node switches can lead to.
Next, we show that some elements (i.e., σ ’s) have interesting cyclic properties. This is particularly useful by noting
that B is not cyclic in general. According to Cauchy’s Theorem: if prime number p divides B, then B must have an
element of order p. Essentially, this means that there are at least k elements in B, such that each of these elements that
would degenerate to the identity element e . More formally, we have
σ
pi
i = σi ⋆ · · ·⋆ σi
︸         ︷︷         ︸
pi
= e, 1 ≤ i ≤ k .
Intuitively, this means that some multiplications of pool-update maps would eventually result in the trivial map—no
node switch at all.
4.2.3 Homomorphism to Symmetric Group SΩ . We conclude this section with a sketch about the intrinsic relationship
between Bn,r , and the well-studied group Sn . As a starting point, wewant to reemphasize Cayley’s Theorem that states:
every group G is isomorphic to a subgroup of a symmetric group S |G |. That is to say, Bn,r is structurally identical, up
to the operation ⋆ and a one-to-one mapping, to a subgroup of the well-understood symmetric group SBn,r . More
specifically, we know that Bn,r is part of a lattice of the symmetric group SB . Historically, a subgroup of a symmetric
group is also called a permutation group. However, it should be noted that working directly on a SB is prohibitively
costly: the order of SB is |SBn,r | = (nr )!. Using Stirling’s approximation, we have:
|SBn,r | = (nr )! ∼
√
2pinr · (n
r
e
)nr .
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If we have a 10-node tiny blockchain with two pools,n = 10 and r = 2, the order of the blockchain group is manageable:
|B10,2 | = 100; and yet, the corresponding symmetric group has a order of: |SB10,2 | ≈
√
200pi · ( 100e )100 > 2512, which is
computationally infeasible. As a side note, the state-of-the-art hash function for many production blockchain systems
SHA256 takes 512-bit inputs and return 256-bit outputs; the order of a tiny-scale B group thus, as we just showed,
already hit such a high security level. Therefore, in the following, we provide analytical insights on the relationship
between Bn,r and Sn .
The key correlation between Bn,c and Sn lies at the structure of pools in the blockchain. Although we differentiate
the elements in the set of poolsC into {c0, c1, . . . , cr−1}, what really makes these elements different is its membership
of σ ’s between node-switch sets Φ’s. Specifically, if a map σ only updates the pool index with the node membership
unchanged within each pool, then the new blockchain is essentially a permutation of the original one up to the pool
topology. Formally, in any σ : Φi 7→ Φj , if for any subsetM ⊆ N and anym ∈ M we have both {φm (a) = b} ⊆ Φi and
{φm(a) = c} ⊆ Φj . With this constraint, the blockchain group B degenerates to a symmetric group at the granularity
of pools: Bn,r  Sn . It should be noted that this result is not applicable to a general blockchain group.
5 FINAL REMARK
This paper presents the first study on the algebraic structure of blockchains with an emphasis on the internal properties
under algebraic groups. We axiomatically construct a blockchain group and derive some interesting properties that
can be potentially taken into the design space and parametric analysis of real-world blockchain systems. Specifically,
we show that (i) a blockchain group, B, comprises non-trivial subgroups and lattices that can be possibly leveraged for
cryptography; (ii) although B is non-cyclic in general, there exist cyclic elements in B, which can help us reduce space
in some scenarios; and (iii) B is homomorphic to the well-studied symmetric group SΩ if some constraints hold, thus
opening the door to applying the wisdom of SΩ to B.
Our future work lies in the development of algebraic structures among multiple blockchains. For instance, the cross-
blockchain transactions [8] might be analogous to group actions, which can be possibly modeled by the orbitswith the
conjugate entities from distinct blockchains. As another example, it would be worthwhile to explore the consequence
of the primality of the number of nodes, where we might apply some number-theoretical techniques.
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